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BRIEF FOR AMICUS CU
RIAE
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGI
CAL ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORTOF RESP
ONDENT
INTERESTOF AMICUS
CURIAE

The American Psychologica
l Association (“APA”),
a
voluntary nonprofit, scient
ific, and professional organi
zation with more than 70,
000 members, has been
the
major association of psy
chologists since 1892.
Am
ong
APA’s major functions
are the improvement of
research

methods, the disseminatio
n of inform

ation regarding human behavior, and, as ref
lected in its Bylaws, the
“advance[ment] of psycholog
y as a science and profes
sion.”
APA contributes amicus
briefs only where it has
special knowledge to share
with the Court. APA reg
ards
this as one of those cases.
Psychologists have genera
ted
almost all the research
on sex stereotyping, the
sin
gle
most important basis on
which the courts below fo
un
d the
petitioner to have violat
ed respondent’s civil rights
. APA
wishes to inform this Cou
rt of scientific thought
regarding stereotyping, partic
ularly as it affects judg
me
nts of
women in work settings.
The APA has participa
ted as
amicus in many cases
in this Court involving
social
Science issues, including
Watson y,. Fort Worth
Ba
nk
Trust, No. 86-6139 (19
&
88) (validation of subjec
tivepersonnel evaluation device
s) ; and Lockhart v. Mc
Cree, 476
U.S. 162 (1986) (“c
onviction-proneness” of
‘deathqualified” juries).
Petitioner and responden
t have consented to the
filing
of this amicus brief.

INTRODUCTION AN
D SUMMARY OF AR
GUMENT

The question before thi
s Court is Whether, in
cages
brought under Title VI
I of the Civil Rights Ac
t of 1964,
2 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
where the plaintiff has
satisfied
the trier of fact that
intentional discriminati
on
affected
the defendant’s employ
ment decision, the plaint
iff must

2
also prove that the decision would have been made in her
favor absent discrimination. Because the crucial finding
of discrimination in this case was grounded on direct
evidence that the employer’s selection process “was impermissibly infected by stereotypical attitudes towards
female candidates,” Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825
F.2d 458, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the parties have focused
a significant degree of attention on the issue of sex stereotypes. APA will leave it to them to argue the meritsof
the question presented but insofar as that question may
be determined by the underlying issues of thescientific
trustworthiness of the concept of sex stereotyping, APA
wishes to inform this Court of the nature and validity of
the concept and of the ways in which it may have “played
a significant role,” id. at 469, in the petitioner-employer’s
decision.
To convince this Court that the opinions below were
erroneous, the petitioner consistently disparages sex stereotyping and the testimony of the social science expert,
Susan Fiske, Ph.D., who appeared on behalf of Ms. Hopkins.1 At best, petitioner concedes that the partners’
comments at issue “might conceivably be taken as indicating that stereotypical thinking was sometimes present
1 For example, petitioner places the term sex stereotyping within

quotations, falsely implying that it is neologistic or unaccepted.

See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 2. Petitioner characterizes as an
“amorphous proposition” the court of appeals finding that the employer discriminated against the employee because of “stereotypical
attitudes,” id. at 14, and claims that the finding was derived from
‘intuitions about unconscious sexism—discernible only through an

‘expert’ judgment... .” Id. at 16-17. Petitioner seeks to discredit

Dr. Fiske’s testimony by labeling it as “gossamer evidence,” id.
at 19, and “intuitively divined.” Jd. at 40. It claims her conclusions were faulty because she never met Hopkins and only reviewed
the partners’ evaluations of her. Jd. at 18. See also, id. at 19, 42.
In sum, petitioner accuses the lower courts of basing a finding of
intentional discrimination on “a chain of intuitive hunches about
‘unconscious’ sexism” which “were, in turn, magically transformed
into evidentiary ‘facts’ by a shift in the burden of persuasion.”
Id. at 41.

‘in the air’ at Price Waterhouse..
. .” Id. at 45. But,

petitioner’s argument is that any find
ing of intentional
sex discrimination is merely based on
the peculiar and
eccentric judgments of a purported expe
rt who was inclined to discover sex stereotyping
whether or not it actually existed in the minds and cond
uct of the partners
at Price Waterhouse.?

Petitioner’s view is reminiscent of the
now indefensible
position in Plessy v, Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), that
feelings of inferiority expressed by
blacks as a result of
racial segregation were evoked “solely
because the colored
race chooses to put that construction
upon it.” Td. at
551. Almost 100 years later, peti
tioner essentially asks
2 Of course, petitioner ig now
barred from challenging the quali
fications of Dr. Fiske or the
admissibility of the subject
matter
upon which shetestified. The
trial court stated that Dr. Fisk
e was
a “well qualified expert, who
has done extensive research and
study
in the field of stereotyping.”
618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.
D.C.
1985). The court of appeals
said, “To the extent that Pric
e
Wate
rhouse believes

Dr. Fiske lacked necessary informat
ion,

the firm is
in fact quarrelling with her
field of expertise and the meth
odology
it employs. Defendant, howe
ver, failed to challenge the
validity
of Dr. Fiske’s discipline at trial
and disavows any such challeng
e
here.” 825 F.2d 458, 467 (D.C
. Cir. 1987). Nevertheless,
amicus
believes petitioner’s claim that
Dr. Fiske’s testimony lacked
validity because she did not
personally interview Ms. Hopk
ins igs
scientifically naive and irrelevant
. Petitioner confuses the work
of
research psychologists like Dr.
Fiske with that of clinical psyc
holo
gists who use interviews and
other assessment devices to arri
ve at
a diagnosis of a patient. The
issue about which Dr. Fiske
was
asked to testify concerned the
presence vel non of discrimi
natory
stereotyping at Price Waterhou
se, not the mental status
of Ms.
Hopkins. The proper focus,
then, was on the conduct of
petit
ioner’s
partners, reflected in their evalu
ations. Dr. Fiske brought prec
isely
that focus when she evaluate
d the conditions at Price Wate
rhouse
that evoke stereotyping and
the judgments of its partners
in light
of the research literature on
stereotyping. In any event, peti
tioner
Should have availed itself of the
rules of evidence, see Fed. R.
Evid.
702-705, and case law, ¢.9., Frye
v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923

), at the trial level if it wanted
to lodge the challenges
it now makes here.

gue
Se

terize women in a
Manner that underm
ines judgments
about their competen
ce. Evaluation of
women’s work
performance jg ofte
n attributed to fa
ctors other than
ability, detrimentall
y affecting organiza
tional rewards
as violating sex-rela
ted expectations, Th
us, sex stereotyping has a demons
trably negative and
discriminatory
effect on women in wo
rk settings. Part II.
Psychologists have
identified the condit
ions that promote such discrimi
natory stereotyping
in work settings,
Those conditions we
re all present in pe
titioner’s place of
employment. Part III
. Discriminatory st
ereotyping, however, can be preven
ted by adopting su
ch methods as pro-

5:
centives that indicate consensual disapproval of stereotyping. Petitioner failed to employ any of those methods.
Part IV. Amicus concludes that sex stereotyping existed
in petitioner’s employment setting, was transformed into
discriminatory behavior, and played a significant role
in the decision of petitioner not to select respondent as a
partnerof the firm.
ARGUMENT

I. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON SEX STEREOTYPING
HAS BEEN CONDUCTED OVER MANY DECADES
AND IS GENERALLY ACCEPTED IN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY

The extent to which a body of social science evidence
has gained general acceptance within the scientific community is critical to its acceptance by the judicial System. See Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law,
1384 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 (1986); Melton, Bringing Psychology to the Legal System: Opportunities, Obstacles,
and Efficacy, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 488 (1987). Although
no uniform standard determines general acceptance of
the status of research in the social or natural sciences,’
acceptability can be ascertained by the application of
several evaluative criteria.* The quality of empirical re8% See, e.g., Black, Evolving Legal Standards for the Admissi
bility
of Scientific Evidence, 239 SciENCE 1508 (1988) ; Giannell
i, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States,
a Half-Century Later, 80 CoLum. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
See generally Proposals for a Model Rule on Admissibility of
Scientific

Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 84 (1987).

4The use of such criteria for evaluating social science
research
has been proposed by legal scholars trained in social
science

methodology and the uses and misuses of social science researc
h

by the courts. See, e.g., W. LOH, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE
JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1984); J. MoNAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL
SCIENCE IN
LAW (1985); Bersoff, Social Science Data and the Suprem
e Court:
Lockhart as a Case in Point, 42 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST
52 (1987);

6
search and, by implication, its general acceptance in the
scientific community, is established by the use of valid
research methods, its support by a body of other research,
its scrutiny through critical peer review in the relevant
scientific community, and subsequent publication of that
research in respected journals.

By far, the most important criterion is validity. Social
scientists distinguish between two kinds of research
validity—internal and external. See E. LIND, J. SHAPARD
& J. CectL, EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW (1981). Internal validity “refers to the trustworthiness of a piece of research
on its own terms. ... To have high validity, a study
must rule out, or control for, competing hypotheses that
may account for an observed state of affairs.” SocIAL
AUTHORITY, supra note 4, at 502. Scientific research
is authoritative to the extent that it has employed
research designs that minimize various known threats
to internal validity. External validity refers to the extent to which research can be generalized across different
people, different settings, and over time. The more often
a study confirms prior research or is confirmed by subsequent research and the more often a body of research
with different methodologies supports a common proposition, the less likely it is that chance fluctuations in the
data, overlooked variables, or methodological anomalies
account for thefindings.
Thus, just as the law accords greater respect to legal
principles enunciated by many different courts in different jurisdictions, so too does the trustworthiness and acColquitt, Judicial Use of Social Science Evidence at Trial, 30 ARIZ.
L. Rev. 51 (1988); Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U.

Pa. L. Rev. 477 (1986) [hereinafter SociaL AUTHORITY]; Monahan

& Walker, Social Science in Law: A New Paradigm, 43 AM. PsyCHOLOGIST 465 (1988).

f
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ceptance of scientific research increase as different studies

yield essentially convergent results about the phenomenon
at issue.

In this context one can evaluate the general acceptance
of research on stereotyping in the scientific community.
The scientific study of social stereotypes® has been an
active field of inquiry for over five decades. See,
€.9.,
Katz & Braly, Racial Stereotypes of One Hundred College Students, 28 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PsycHOLOGY
280
(1933). Stimulated by a now classic treatise, see G.
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954), psycho
logists have examined the cognitive, motivational, and behavioral foundations of stereotyping. Research on
sex
stereotypes * has been an integral part of this voluminous
literature: 8
°The term “stereotype” was used in the printi
ng trade in the
early 1800’s but did not become part of the mainst
ream of social

scientific thought until 1922. W. LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINIO
N (1922).

—_%—____@

-

®For reviews, see, e.g., J. Dovivio & S. GAERTN
ER, PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM (1986); S. Fiske
& S. TAYLOR,
SOCIAL COGNITION (1984); Ruble & Ruble, Sex
Stereotypes in IN
THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN STEREOTYPING (A. Miller ed. 1982) [hereinafter Ruble
& Ruble]; Ashmore & Del Boca, Conceptual Approaches
to Stereotypes and
Stereotyping in COGNITIVE PROCESS IN STEREO
TYPING AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 1 (D. Hamilton ed. 1981); Cauthe
n, Robinson &
Krauss, Stereotypes: A Review of the Literature
1926-1965, 84
J. Soc. PsycHoLocy 103 (1971).
7 Although psychologists distinguish “sex” as
biological
“gender” as the associated psychological states,
Deaux, Sex
Gender, 36 Ann. Rev. Psychology 49, 51 (1985)
[hereinafter
and Gender], the former will be used herein, consist
ent with
courts below.

and
and
Sex
the

8In the psychological literature between 1967
and 1982, there
were 12,689 articles published on human sex
differences, 3,621
articles on sex roles generally and 1,765 article
s on sex role attitudes specifically. Id. at 50. A computer-assisted
bibliographic
search conducted for this brief found that from
1974-1987, 1,564
articles were published on stereotypes, with over
20% pertaining
to sex.

8
Beliefs about the sexes have a history at least as
long as the actual study of those differences, and perhaps longer if one includes statements by those
philosophers and social commentators who predated
the development of modern psychology.® The ways
in which people think about women and mencanbe,
and have been, considered from a variety of perspectives, from broad-based attitudinal surveys about the
roles of women and men to specific evaluations of
individual male and female performance.
Sex and Gender, supra note 7, at 65.

Early research generated many empirical demonstrations that different expectations for female and male behavior produce different and unequal judgments about
men’s and women’s performance.” Research conducted
in the past 15 years has systematically revealed the cognitive structure of sex stereotypes and the psychological
processes by which they influence behavior, including behavior in the workplace. See Parts II-III, infra.
®° For a brief history of the philosophical and religious attitudes
people have harbored about women, see Ruble & Ruble supra note 6

at 188-193.

10 See, e.g., O’Leary, Some Attitudinal Barriers to Occupational
Aspirations in Women, 81 Psychological Bull. 809 (1974); Rosenkrantz, Vogel, Bee, Broverman, Sexz-role Stereotypes and SelfConcepts in College Students, 32 J. CONSULTING & CLIN. PSYCHOLoGy 287 (1968) [hereinafter Sez-role Stereotypes]; Pheterson,
Kiesler & Goldberg, Evaluation of the Performance of Women as
a Function of their Sex, Achievement and Personal History, 19

J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsycHoLocy 114 (1971).

11 See, e.g., A. EAGLY, SEX DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL BEHAVIORS A
SocIAL-ROLE INTERPRETATION (1987); Deaux & Kite, Gender and
Cognition in WoMEN & SoclETY: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PER-

SPECTIVES 92 (B. Hess & M. Ferree eds. 1986); Taylor, A Cate-

gorization Approach to Stereotyping in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN
STEREOTYPING: AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 88 (D. Hamilton ed.

1981) [hereinafter Taylor]; Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings:

The Lack of Fit Model in 5 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BE-

9

Research on sex stereotypes clearly
satisfies the essential criteria for general scientific acce
ptance.2 As amicus
will show, researchers on sex ster
eotypes have used an
impressive diversity of empirical
methodologies (including surveys and laboratory and field
experiments), qualitative and quantitative measureme
nt strategies in a
variety of research Settings (includi
ng the workplace),
with a variety of subject populations
( including managers
who make selection decisions),
to examine how people
think about women and men and
how their perceptions
influence social behavior.*3 This
body of research yields
an internally valid pattern of
consistent, mutually confirmatory findings as well as
considerable convergence
across time, about the judgmental
and behavioral conseHAVIOR 269 (B. Staw & L.
Cummings ed. 1983)
Bias in Work Settings].

[hereinafter Sex

12Tn addition to the cruc
ial criteria of inte

rnal and external
validity, for support that rese
arch on sex stereotyping has
withstoo

= __=s

d scrutiny by anonymous
expert peer reviewers of
journal
articles, see supra nn. 6,
8, 10-11, & 13 ag well as
Parts II-IV,
infra. The applicability
of research on sex stereoty
ping to legal
issues is self-evident as
this case makes clear. See
also Taub,
Keeping Women in Their
Place: Stereotyping Per
Se
as
a Form
of Employment Discriminati
on, 21 B. C. L. Rev.
3845,
849-361
(1980) ( reviewing research
).

183 See, eg., S. Basow, GEN
DER STEREOTYPES: TRADIT
IONS AND
ALTERNATIVES (1986) ; C.
Tavris & C. OFFIR, THE
LONGEST War:
SEX DIFFERENCES IN PERSPE
CTIVE (1977) : Rosen, Car
eer Progress
of Women: Getting In
and Staying In in WomMEN
IN
THE WorRK
Force 70 (H. Bernardin
ed. 1982) [hereinafter Car
eer
Progress
of Women]; Ruble & Rubl
e, supra note 6; Spence,
Dea
ux, &
Helmreich, Sex Roles in
Contemporary American
Soci
ety
in 2
HANDBOOK OF SOC

IAL PSYCHOLOGY 149 (G. Lin
dze

y
eds. 1985); Smx AND GEN
DER, supra note 7; Nieva
Effects on Evaluation, 5
ACAD. OF Mem. Rev. 267
inafter Sex Effects]; Wall
ston & O’Leary, Sex and

& E. Aronson
& Gutek, Sex
(1980) [hereGender Make

a. Difference: The Differential
Perceptions of Women & Men
, 2
REV. OF PERSONALITY AND Soc.
Psycnooey 9- (1981).
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quences of sex stereotypes, including in the employment
Lo,
setting.
II. STEREOTYPING UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS
CAN
CREATE
DISCRIMINATORY
CONSEQUENCES FOR STEREOTYPEDGROUPS, INCLUDé ING WOMEN
A. Stereotypes About Women Shape Perceptions About

~ Women’s Typical and Acceptable Roles in Society.

Stereotypes result from the normal cognitive process of
categorization. Individuals form stereotypic beliefs about
groups of people in much the same way they generalize
about any aspect of their environment. “Stereotyping can
be a work-saving, efficient cognitive enterprise, serving to
simplify and organize the complex world we encounter.”
Sex Bias in Work Settings, supra note 11, at 271, “The
leap from categorization to stereotyping ... is a small
one. Stereotypes, both benign and pernicious, evolve to
describe categories of people.” Taylor, supra note 11, at
84. Stereotypes, then, are “a set of attributes ascribed
to a group and imputed to its individual members simply
because they belong to that group.” Sex Bias in Work
Settings, supra note 11, at 271. Stereotypes “are not
necessarily any moreorless inaccurate, biased, or logically
faulty than are anyother kinds of cognitive generalizations,” Taylor, supra note 11, at 84, and they need not
inevitably lead tBliseriminatory conduct.
a
14 This Court has acknowledged that sexual stereotypes exist
and
can affect employment decisions. See, e.g., City of Los
Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 485 U.S. 702, 707
(1978):
It is now well recognized that employment decisions
cannot

be predicated on mere “stereotyped” impressions about the

characteristics of males andfemales. Myths and
purely
habitual assumptions about a woman’s inability to
perform
certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons
for
refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying
them
less.
Accord, Cty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161,
180 (1981)
quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194, 1198 ©

(7th Cir. 1971): “In forbidding employers to discriminate
against

Lt

“The problem is that Stereo
types about groups of people often are overgeneralizat
ions and are either inaccurat
e
or do not apply to the indivi
dual group member in question.” Sex Bias in Work
Settings, supra note 11, at
271
(emphasis in original). Tha
t is because a categorizati
on

tions of behavior based
on those characteristics,
are readily relied on

0
comes more difficult for
the classifier to respond
to the
other person’s own par
ticular characteristics,
ma
king
accurate, differentiated,
and unique impressions
less
likely. In such instances
, people tend to percei
ve members of the other groupas
all alikeor to expect
them to
be all alike, which they
never are. Foy example,
even
when behavior is held
constant in carefully con
trolled
laboratory conditions, mal
es are seen as more inf
luential,
more confident, and some
what more deserving of
respect
than women, perceptions
consonant with sex ste
reotypes.>
See Categorical Bases, su
pra note 15.

in
divi
individua.ls

7,

because of their Sex
, Congress nigpes
the entire spectrum
to strike at
of disparate treatm
ent o
en
resulting
atn
d women
ym sex stereotypes.
.. which ha
plagued women in
the past.’

go ° ster

es

1 Thig process, “ca
tegorical responding,”
is a yn ajor component
of stereotyping. See, e.g.
, Wild
ceiving Persons as a Gro
Categorization and
up:
Intergroup Re
ons in COGNITIVE PRO
STEREOTYPING AND
CESSES IN
INTERGROUP BEHAVI
OR 213 (D, Hamilt
1981). The phenom
on» ed.
enon is illustrated
by
such comments as “th
all look alike to me
ey
” or “I remember
awoman made a co
at the meeting, but
mment
I can’t remember whi
ch one said it”. See
Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff
, e.9.,
-& Ruderman, Cate
goricalBases of Per
Memory and Stereotyp
son
ing, 36

J. PERSONALITY & Soc
. Psycuotocy
778 (1978) [hereinafter
Categorical Bases].
:
:

®

j

|
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discriminatory behavior. Whethe
r realized or not,’® stereotypic beliefs create expectati
ons about a person before
that person is encountered and
lead to distorted judgments about behavior. Therefore
, “stereotypes become the
basis for faulty reasoning leadin
g to biased feelings and
actions, disadvantaging (or adv
antaging) others not because of who they are or wha
t they have done but because of what group they belong
to.” Sex Bias in Work
Settings, supra note 11, at 271
. Asa result, people treat
members of an ingroup preferen
tially, whether in assigning positive traits or in alloca
ting rewards.” The choice
by men to hire or promote com
parable men Over women
is the most pertinent example.?8
Sex, because of its Salience and
visibility, is a common
basis for categorization and
sex stereotypes are the prod16 Uleman, Consciousnes
s and Control: The Cas
e of Spontanous
Trait Inferences, 13 PER
SONALITY & Soc. PSYCHO
LOGY BULL. 337
(1987).

17 See, e.g., Allen &
Wilder, Categorization,
Belief Similarity,
and Intergroup Discri
mination, 32 J. PERSON
ALITY & Soc. PsyCHOLOGY 971 (1975) ;
Tajfel & Billig, Famila
rity and Categorization in Intergroup Beh
avior, 10 J. EXPER.
Soc
. PSYCHOLOGY 159 —
(1974).
18 See, e.g., Heilman,
Information as a Deterr
ent Against Sex
Discrimination: The
Effects of Applicant
Sex and Information
Type on Preliminary
Employment Decisions,
33 Orcan. BEHAV. &
HUM. Perr, 174 (1984)
[hereinafter Informati
on as Deterrent];
Heilman & Sto

peck, Attractiveness and

Corporate Success: Different Causal Attributi
ons for Males and Fem
ales, 70 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOLOGY 329 (1985)
; Rosen & Jerdee, Eff
ects of Applicants’
Sex and Difficulty of
Job on Evaluations of
Candidates for Managerial Positions, 59
J. Applied Psychology
9 (1974); Rosen &
Jerdee, Perceived Sex
Differences in Manageria
lly Relevant Characteristics, 4 Sex Rozs
837 (1978); “These stu
dies [referring to
work by Rosen & Jer
dee] found that manage
rs held rather consistent biases against
women with respect
to promotions to man
agerial positions, ass
ignments to demanding
jobs, and selection
for supervisory training.
” Ruble, Cohen & Rub
le, Sex Stereotypes:
Occupational Barriers
for Women, 27 Am. BEH
AV. SCIENTIST 839,
348 (1984) ; see also ref
erences cited in Part II
(B).

4
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est

uct. Sex stereotypes have two features
. First, they
Specify the attributes characteristic of
each sex. Second,
they dictate which behaviors are appropri
ate for men and
women. Either can cause sex disc
rimination, the one
based on faulty descriptive beliefs
about what women
are like and the other based on norm
ative expectations
about what women should be like. See
Terborg, Women
in Management: A Research Revi
ew. 62 J. APPLIED
PsycHoLocy 647 (1977).
With regard to descriptive beliefs,
studies of

sex stereotypes have repeatedly demonstrated
that men and women
are viewed very differently by all
kinds of people. In
fact, men and women are viewed
as polar opposites with
respect to many personality attribut
es. With regard to

achievement oriented traits, men are
thought to be competent, stro

ng, independent, active, competitive,
and selfconfident and women are thou
ght to be incompetent,
weak, dependent, passive, uncompet
itive, and unconfident.”°
©
The traits stereotypically associat
ed with women and
men are not only different but the
y are seen as differentially desirable. Although each is
credited with a number
of positive traits, persons of both
sexes concur that those
traits perceived to be related to
men are more valued
than those related to women, See
Sex-role Stereotypes,
@
Broverman, Vogel, Broverman,
Clarkson & Rosenkrantz,
Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal,
27 J. Soc. IssuEsS 59
Foushee, Helmreich & Spence,
Implicit Theories Of Masand Feminity: Dualistie
or Bipolar? 83 PSYCHOLOGY
OF
WOMEN Q. 259 (1979) ; Ruble

19 See
Sex-role
(1972) ;
culinity

& Ruble, supra note 6.

20 Societal stereotypes abou
t women are extremely tena
cious and
have held despite when the
investigation occurred or the
type of
methodology employed. See
Sex Bias in WorkSettings,
supra note
Il, at 272. A recent stud
y found no change in atti
tudes toward
women executives; male MBA
s held ag negative attitude
s toward
such women in

the1980s as in the 1970s, Dubno,
Attitudes

Toward Women Executives:

OF Mem. J. 235 ( 1985).

A> Longitudinal Approach,
28 ACAD.

:

:
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supra note 10. Achievement,
a trait associated with
see

ms to be more highly valued
in our society than :
turance or affiliation, tra
its associated with wome
n, |
Despite the fact that these
perceptions have been er
e
ished and time-honored, ma
ny of the presumed diff
ren
ces
—
between males and female
s are based in myth.
ere is
no support for the view
that women lack the mot
i
)
to achieve nor are
ley less intelligent than
men
.
See
EK. Maccosy & C. ACK
LIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY
F SEX
DIFFERENCES ( 1974). A
considerable body of lit
erature
demonstrates women
ve similar vocational int
erests,
leadership abilities, proble
m solving abilities, and
potential managerial] capacitie
s as do men.2! Thus, in
many
areas directly related to“
achievement, men and
women
are more alike than differ
ent, Yet, the view persis
ts that
there are crucial differenc

es,

"
With regard to normative
beliefs, the expectation
that
members of a different
s
] category will be simila
r to
_¢ach other can carr
y prescriptive or normat
ive implications. Norms govern
ing the approved mas
culine or
feminine stereotypes im
age are cl
ly
def
ine
d and widely
rhengt ony Normsspe
.
cify beh viors that are
thought ©»
to be
only characteristic of ea
ch sex, but also desirable
and encouraged. For ex
ample, females who dis
play “womanly” traits and males
who display “manly”
traits are
more favorably evalua
é
ted and judged more
~
psychologi-

*

@

@

21 See

:

Matthews,Emplo

Characteristics ofHe and yment Implications of Psychological
Women in WOMEN IN THE
27 (M?Katzell &
Work FORCE
W. Byh
am edsg1972) ; Bass,

Krusell & Alexander
,
’ Attitudes Toward Wor
king Women, 15 Am.
TIST 221 ( 971); Da
SCIENy & Stogdi

Male Mana.

Females Supervisors:

CHOLOGY,353 (1972).

ll, Leader Behavior
of Male and
A Comparative Stu
dy, 25 PERSONNEL
Psy>

“eo
22 See, é.g., Lunnen
borg, Stereotypic
Aspects in Masculini
eminity Measurement,
ty34 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PsycHoLocy
776 (1970) ; McKee
& Sherriffs,

and Self Concepts, 65 Am. J. Men’s and Women’s Beliefs, Ideals,
OF theeg1959); Ste
Fox, Male-Female
inmann &
Perceptions of

the Female
States, 64 J. PsycHoLo
cy 265 (1966).
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cally health than those
who do not.2? Conversel
y, those :
who engagein what is per
cei
can be the victim of social ved to.be cross-sex behavior .
sanctions. A woman who
speaks aggressively, str
ides across. the room, an
d wears
no-nonsense clothes is per
ceived to” be insufficient
ly feminine. Such discrepant
individuals are psycholog
ically
“fenced off” from the res
t of the group into a
subcategory, often one tha
t is ea evaluated
. In the
present case, Ms. Hopk
ins’ Supporters descri
bed her behavior as outspoken, ind
ependent, self-confident,
assertive,
- and courageous. He
r detractors interpret
ed
the same
behavior as oy rbeari
ng, arrogant, self-cent
ered and
abrasive. The former
descriptions fit the im
age of a
competent partner; the
latter fit into the Stereo
type -of
the “women’s libber,” see
‘
618 F. Supp. at 1117;
825 F.oq
at 458, or the “Iron
Maiden”_g frequent
subcategory
for career Women wh
o are perceived ‘to be
unf
eminine.25
These value ‘judgments
become @ critical dime
nsion along
3 See, e.g., Costrich,

Feinstein, Kidder, Ma
recek & Pascale,
When Stereotypes
Hurt: Three Studie
s of Penalties for
Reversals, 11 J. EXP
Sex-role
ER. & Soc. PsycHo
.ocy 520 (1975) [he
after When Stereotyp
reines Hur t] and n.25, inf
ra.
oe
24 Because categoriz
ation influences one
’s interpretation
individual’s action,
of an
the Same behavior
can be reinterprete
of one’s stereotypes.
d in light
JS. ee Categorical Bas
es, supra note 15.
25 R. KANTER, MEN
AND WOMEN OFTHE
CORPORATION 233-237
(1977) [hereinafter
KANTER]; Brown
& Gei 8, Turning Le
Gold: Evaluations
ad into
of Men and Wome
n Leader
s and the Alchemy
,

ae

.
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which others are evaluated. This is especially the case

where the behavior is distinctly contrary to the stereotyped expectation, as when a woman uses profanity.”°
In sum, descriptive stereotypes characterize women in
a manner that undermines their competence and effectiveness; normative stereotypes cast as deviants those women
whose behavior seems inappropriately masculine. Hach
has potentially detrimental and discriminatory consequences for women who are achievement-oriented.
B. Sex Stereotypes Have Demonstrably Negative Effects on Women in Work Settings.

A multitude of studies has shown that providing precisely the same information about job qualifications or
job performance and merely varying the identity associated with the information as either male or female
leads to differential and negative evaluations of the
woman or her work.” This is true when women apply
for jobs or seek promotions once on the job.
When an individual first seeks entry into an organization, because of the visibility of sex as an attribute,
. €
26 Fiske & Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation from
Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Informa-

tion and Motivation on. Attention and Interpretation in 23 AD-

VANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PsycHoLocy (M. Zanna ed. in
press) [hereinafter Fiske & Neuberg]; Higgins & Bargh, Social

Cognition and Social Perception, 38 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 369
(1987) [hereinafter Higgins & Bargh].

27 See, e.g., Dipboye, Arvey & Terpstra, Sex and Physical AttrativenessOt Rates and Applicants as Determinants of Resume
Evaluations, 62 J. APPLIED PsycHOLOGy 288 (1977); Dipboye,
Fromkin & Wiback, Relative Importance of Applicant Sex, Attractiveness, and Scholastic Standing in Evaluation of Job Applicant
Resumes, 60 J. APPLIED PsycHoLocy 39 (1975); Terborg & Ilgen,
A Theoretical Approach to Sex Discrimination in Traditionally
Masculine Occupations, 13 ORG. BEHAV. & HuM. PERF. 352 (1975) ;
When Stereotypes Hurt, supra note 28; Zickmund, Hitt &
Pickens, Influence of Sex and Scholastic Performance on Reactions
to Job Applicant Resumes, 63 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 252 (1978).
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sex stereotypes are apt to be a predominant element in
decisionmaking. The attributes ascribed to women are
not those believed essential for work success, e.g., achievement orientation, and, thus, “sex discrimination has
been repeatedly demonstrated in employee selection processes,” Sex Bias in Work Settings, supra note 11, at
280, most particularly when women apply for traditionally male positions.** Not only are males judged preferable to females and evaluated more favorably in selection
deliberations, but they are likely to be offered higher
starting salaries and higher level positions.2® Such differential evaluations of applicants for managerial positions are greater, as in this case, when jobs are more
demanding and challenging. See Career Progress of
Women, supra note 13.

Once on the job, sex-stereotypic attributes bias the
evaluation of women’s work performance. Women’s
achievements are perceived in a way which fit with
stereotypic ideas regardless of whether facts about an
individual woman objectively support the perception. As
a result, accomplishments by women are significantly
more likely to be discounted than the same accomplishments by men because the successful performance of
women is attributed to ephemeral or unstable causal
factors. Performance of women in traditionally male
jobs is very often devalued simply because they are
women,*° or because their highly accomplished performance is attributed to good luck or hard work, rather

jaa

28 See Olian, Schwab & Haberfield,
Gender Compared to Qualifications on
40 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hum.
(1988) and Career Progress of Women,

The Impact of Applicant
Hiring Recommendations,
DEcISION Processes 180
supra note 18 for reviews.

29 See Dipboye, Arvey & Terpstra, supra note 27 ; Terborg &
Ilgen, supra note 27. These discriminatory behaviors are evident
even among people who deny any prejudice toward women in
management. See Evaluation of Men and Women Leaders, supra
note 25, at 817.
80 See Sex Bias in Work Settings, supra note 11; Sex Effects,
supra note 13.
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than sheer ability and competence.** That these evaluations are not based on competence results in judgments
detrimentally affecting the degree to which organizational rewards are accorded women and impedes career
progress.*”
Even if descriptive stereotypes are not operative, it is
likely that other stereotypic processes will lead to negative
consequences. Most importantly, normative expectations
can result in detrimental evaluations. Women pursuing
traditionally masculine occupations are likely to be penalized for their violation of sex-related expectations no matter what their background or qualifications and they are
often forced to cope with negative reactions to their “outof-role’ behaviors.* This might explain why petitioner
refused to make Ms. Hopkins a partner despite the fact
that she brought in $40 million worth of business.
81 See Deaux & Emswiller, Explanation of Successful Performance on Sex-Linked Tasks: What is Skill for the Male is Luck for
the Female, 29 J. Pers & Soc. PsycHoLocy 80 (1974); Taynor &
Deaux, Equity and Perceived Sex Differences: Role Behavior as
Defined by the Task, the Mode, and the Action. 32 J. PRs. & Soc.
PsyCHOLOGY 381 (1975). Individuals who hold negative attitudes
toward the presence of women in managerial positions are particularly likely to show such biases. Garland & Price, Attitudes
Toward Women in Management and Attributions for their Success
and Failure in a Managerial Position, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY

705 (1977).

82 Heilman & Guzzo, The Perceived Cause of Work Success as
a Mediator of Sex Discrimination in Organizations, 21 ORIG.
BEHAV. & Hum. PERF. 346 (1978).
33 For example, both women and men are evaluated more favorably when their leadership activities consist of sex appropriate
behaviors, that is, when a female manager is interpersonally
oriented and a male manager is task oriented. See Bartol &
Butterfield, Sex Effects in Evaluating Leaders, 61 J. APPLIED

PsycHoLocy 446 (1976); Coping in the Corporation, supra note

25; Jago & Vroom, Sex Differences in the Incidents & Evaluations
of Participative Leader Behavior, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 776
(1982) ; Rosen & Jerdee, The Influence of Sex-Role Stereotypes on
Evaluations of Male and Female Supervisory Behavior, 57 J.

APPLIED PsycHoLocy 44 (1973).

34 When Stereotypes Hurt, supra note 23. Women who
perform
competently at traditionally male tasks are disliked and ostraciz
ed.
See Hagen & Kahn, Discrimination Against Competent
Women,
5 J. APPLIED Soc. PsycHoLocy 362 (1975).
85 Schein, Relationships Between Sex-Role Stereotypes and
Requisite Management Characteristics Among Female Manager
s, 60
J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 340 (1975) ; Schein, The Relation
ship Between Sex-Role Stereotypes and Requisite Management
Charac-

teristics, 57 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 95 (1978).

36 See Evaluation of Men & Women Leaders, supra
note 25.
This might explain why those supporters of Ms. Hopkins
, whooriginally filled in their evaluations individually and in private,
then
withdrew their support after they found out the negativ
e evalua-

tions of her detractors. Thus, her inconstant supporters were sub-

ject to the same kind of stereotypic dynamics as her
detractors.
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Reactions to women’s out-of-role behavior studied in a
series of laboratory studies uniformly showed that women
who violate norms of feminine passive-dependency are
penalized. They were rated as less popular and as more
poorly adjusted than women who abided by the behaviors
believed appropriate to their sex.* In the classic study of
men and women in a large corporation, women were often
considered in two distinct categories—women and managers. As women, they were measured by how well they
filled the managementroles; as managers they were expected to conform to men’s images of womanhood.
KANTER, supra note 25. These two categorizations are
perceived as incompatibleParadoxically, as with Ms.
Hopkins, women in non-traditional fields are evaluated
negatively if they do their jobs well.
In sum, sex stereotypes place women into a “doublebind” situation. If they are viewed “as women” they are
frequently denied access to high power positions because
their presumed attributes cause them to appear incapable
or their performance is ascribed to something other than
competence. This is particularly the case if coworkers
convey, even in subtle ways, their lack of support for a
female leader.** If, however, they are perceived as enadvancement.
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gaging in “masculine” behaviors deemed essential for the
job, they are considered to be abrasive, or maladjusted.
In many cases, then, the achievement oriented woman is
caught—whatever her behavior, it bodes ill for her career
Ill. THE CONDITIONS THAT PROMOTE STEREOTYPING WERE PRESENT IN PETITIONER’S WORK

SETTING

At least three significant factors promote stereotyping
in social contexts, including employment settings: (1) The
rarity of the stereotyped individual within the evaluation
setting; (2) the ambiguity of criteria used to make an
evaluation; and (3) the paucity of information available
to evaluators. All those factors were present in this
case.
1. Rarity of the Individual. When there are very
few employees who are members of a particular group,
those employees are considerably more likely to be stereotyped than if the group of which they are a part is
represented in large numbers. Singular or rare individuals attract more attention, are evaluated more extremely,
are more likely to be perceived as enacting stereotyped
roles, and are believed to have a greater, sometimes more
disruptive, impact on the group.
A member of a group comprising 15% or less of the
total work force is considered to be in a setting in which
members of the minority have solo status or its psychological equivalent.” Petitioner’s setting meets this criterion.
Ms. Hopkins was the one female in a class of 88 partner
candidates in a firm of 662 partners, only seven of whom
were women.** In such cases, discriminatory outcomes
37 See KANTER, supra note 25, at 206-242. The particular immediate setting matters especially. If 835% of the company’s work
force is females, all but one being secretaries, the one female
managerwill havesolo status. Id.
88 Nothing significant appears to have changed at Price Waterhouse. As of July 1, 1988, petitioner will have 24 women partners
out of a total of 898. See Brief for Petitioner at n.1.
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are demonstrably more likely. One study has shown
that evaluations of women applicants for a managerial
position are significantly less favorable when the applicant pool contains 25% or fewer females. Heilman, The
Impact of Situational Factors on Personnel Decisions
Concerning Women: Varying the Sex Composition of the
Applicant Pool, 26 Oric. BEHAV. AND Hum. PERF,
174
(1984). These evaluations are likely to be even
more
harshly negative if the person is perceived to come
from
a negative social category, e.g., pushy career woman
.
The only woman in an otherwise all-male
setting
attracts attention simply by being different and
more
noticeable.** Being unusual exaggerates other
people’s
perceptions, especially when related to a
stereotyped
category like sex. This is particularly true,
as here,
where the person evaluated is highly visible and
unusually
productive.

89 Kanter, supra note 25, at 206-242; Crock
er & McGraw, What’s
Good for the Goose is not Good for the
Gander: Solo Status as an
Obstacle to Occupational Achievemen
t for Males and Females,
27 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 357 (1982) ;
Wolman & Frank, The Solo
Woman in a Professional Peer Group,
45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY

164 (1975).

40 See McArthur, What Grabs You?
The Role of Attention in
Impression Formation and Causal Attri
bution in 1 SociaL CoqntTION: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 201
(T. Higgins, C. Herman &
M. Zanna eds. 1981); Taylor & Fiske
, Salience, Attention and Attribution: Top of the Head Phenomen
a, 11 Apy. EXPERIMENTAL &

Sianelicasilaaliaauadinataincaai aS

Evaluations of members of a different group, comp
ared
to evaluations of members of one’s own
group, are
likely to be exaggerated and extreme.‘ Accor
dingly, if
one is a male partner and has limited exper
ience with

Soc. PsycHoLocy 249 ( 1978).

41 See, e.g., Allen & Wilder, Categoriza
tion, Belief Similarity,
and Intergroup Discrimination, 32 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PsyCHOLOGY 971 (1975); Linville & Jones
, Polarized Appraisals of

eet

nC

Outgroup Members, 38 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PsycHoLogy 689
(1980).
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female managers, one is likely to evaluate any given
female manager in a more extreme way. Impressions are
even morelikely to be polarized when the person evaluated
has solo or rare status.”
Another effect of rarity is that individuals such as Ms.
Hopkins are likely to be seen as enacting stereotypic
roles. The increased attention to such persons causes
observers to form more “packaged” stereotypic impressions than they otherwise would. This phenomenon,
called “role encapsulation.” see KANTER, supra note 25,
at 230, leads the majority to isolate the minority from
the otherwise homogeneous majority culture.

Lastly, the solo or rare individual is perceived as having greater impact on the group than do members of the
majority. They are perceived as determining the nature
of interactions in which they participate and as a disruptive force. This is true even when the actual behavior of
the rare individual is no different from the rest of the
group.**

2. Ambiguity of Evaluative Criteria. The second factor
that contributes to the potential for stereotyping is the
subjectivity or ambiguity of the criteria used for evaluation. As in this case, interpersonal skills would be more
vulnerable to stereotypic judgments than would garnering a certain amount of business income because of
the greater ambiguity of the former. This is not to
say that subjective criteria violate Title VII and should
not be used in personnel judgments.“ Rather, the point
#2 See FISKE & TAYLOR, SOCIAL
Taylor, supra note 11, at 89-97.

COGNITION

184-190

(1984) ;

43 See KANTER, supra note 25, at 211, 230-237 ; Taylor, supra
note 11, at 89; Categorical Bases, supra note 15.

“4 McArthur, supra note 40; Taylor & Fiske, supra note 40.
45 Well-developed performance criteria using subjective evaluation devices are not necessarily influenced by stereotypice attitudes
or behavior. Performance appraisal systems, based on a thorough
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is that ambiguous criteria are easier to distort on the
basis of stereotypes. This principle has been specifically
demonstrated with sex stereotyping. One review of 58
studies of sex biases in performance evaluations concluded
that “the greater the amount of inference required in
the evaluation situation, the more likely it is that evaluation bias will be found.” Sea Effects, supra note 13, at
170. They found evaluations of qualifications for hiring
and promotion as particularly bias-prone.

i

3. Paucity of Information. Stereotyping is most likely
when decisionmakers have available a paucity of information. Paucity can be defined as (1) information that is
relatively limited beyond some convenient category like
sex; (2) ambiguous information that could be interpreted in multiple ways; and (8) information about the
individual that is irrelevant to the judgment the evaluator must make.

Not surprisingly, research corroborates the commonsense notion that people are more likely to stereotype
another person when they havelittle information about
the other. This is particularly true when the scant
information seems to fit the stereotypic category.‘

#8 Locksley, Borgida, Brekke & Hepburn, Sex Stereotypes and

Social Judgment, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 821

(1980) ; Locksley, Hepburn & Ortiz, Social Stereotypes and Judgments of Individuals: An Instance of the Base Rate Fallacy, 18

J. EXPER. Soc. PsycHoLocy 23 (1982); Rasinski, Crocker & Hastie,

Another Look at Sex Stereotypes and Social Judgments: An Analysis of the Social Perceiver’s Use of Subjective Probabilities, 49
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analysis of job requirements can bereliable, job-related, and fair.
See Brief for Amicus curiae American Psychological Association, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, No. 86-6189. In addition, instructing raters that skills and outcomes rather than personality or mannerisms are the proper basis for performance appraisal as well as organizational policies that unambiguously communicate the inappropriateness of stereotypic bias can result in
unbiased evaluations. Petitioner failed to take these steps. See
Part IV,infra.
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One primary form of ambiguity is mixed behavior, 1.¢.,
some consistent and some inconsistent with the evaluator’s stereotype. For example, when an evaluator categorizes a female professional as an “Iron Maiden” and
she behaves in ways that could be interpreted as supporting the stereotype, ¢.g., she is tough and assertive,
as well as in ways that do not, eg., she is warm and
funny, the evaluator tends to make stereotypic judgments,
even though the information available is balanced.”
Lastly, stereotyping is more likely when the evaluator
appears to have sufficient information but the information

provided is, in fact, irrelevant to the particular judgment

the evaluator is asked to make. For example, that a
female professional wears dark suits and little makeup
is irrelevant to her ability to function as a partner. But,
such facts provide the illusion of having gathered enough
information to make an informed decision and, despite
the logical irrelevance of such information, the irrelevancies seem to reinforce the stereotype. A variety of
studies have examined responses to men and women
described by additional information that was unrelated
both to sex stereotypes and the relevant judgment, e.9.,
a score on a test of low validity with regard to suitability
for a job. Stereotypic responses were made in each case
and the irrelevant information was unable to undercut
the category-based stereotype.** This phenomenon occurs,
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSycHoLoGy 317 (1985). See 618 F. Supp.
at 1118: “The Policy Board gave great weight to the negative
views of individuals who had very little contact with the plaintiff.”
47 See, e.g., Darley & Fazio, Expectancy Confirmation Processes
Arising in the Social Interaction Sequence, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
867 (1980); Deaux & Major, Putting Gender into Context: An
Interactive Model of Gender-Related Behavior, 94 PSYCHOLOGICAL

REVIEW 369 (1987).

48 See, ¢.g., Dipboye, Fromkin & Wiback, supra note 27; Heneman; Impact of Test Information and Applicant Sex on Applicant
Evaluations in a Selection Simulation, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY
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as here, most frequently in
cases where such strong
category labels as sex are invo
lved.*®
IV. ALTHOUGH PETITION
ER WASFOUND TO HAVE
TAKEN NO EFFECTIVE STE
PS TO PREVENTITS
DISCRIMINATORY STER
EOTYPING
OF
RESPONDENT, METHODS AR
E AVAILABLE TO
MONITOR AND REDUCE
THE EFFECTS OF
STEREOTYPING

The district court found, and
the court of appeals
affirmed, that petitioner:

never took any steps in its par
tnership policy statementor in the evaluation forms
submitted to partners
to articulate a policy against
discrimination or to
discourage sexual bias. The
Admissions Committee
never attempted to investigate
whether any of the
negative comments concernin
g the plaintiff were
based on a discriminatory double
standard.
618 F. Supp. at 1118-1119.
Because Stereotypic categorization is a basic feature of
human thinking, amicus
does not suggest that stereotyp
ic beliefs can be elimjnated. However, people can be
taught to recognize categorization, inf
luenced to resist evaluating
ind

ividuals in
categorical terms, and taught
to break the link between
categorization processes and
judgmental consequences,
thus reducing the likelihood
that stereotypic thinking
will be transformed into discri
minatory action.
Three conditions contribute to
the reduction of stereotypic thought and discriminato
ry action: (1) Additional
information; (2) increased
attention to that information and; (8) motivational
incentives that support increased attention and indicate
consensual disapproval of
stereotyping. None of these cond
itions, by itself, is suffi524 (1977) ; Locksley, Bor
gida, Brekke & Hepburn,
supra note 46;
Pheterson, Kiesler & Gol
dberg, supra note 10; Rasi
nski, Crocker
& Hastie, supra note 46.
#9 See, eg., Fiske & Neu
berg, supra note 26; Hig
gins & Bargh,
supra note 26.
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cient but must be present in concert.*° Nevertheless,
petitioner failed to employ any of these conditions.
Information about a particular person can undermine
the use of stereotypes, particularly if that information

is inconsistent with the category (like sex) otherwise
being used on which to base a judgment.*' “By andlarge,

the situations in which differential treatment on the ba-

sis of sex does not occur are the ones in which information clearly relevant to and crisply diagnostic of the target decision has been provided to the decision maker.”
Information as Deterrent, supra note 18, at 185.** Thus,
stereotypesare less likely to affect evaluative judgments
and predictions when employers provide specific behavioral information about employees.”
50 For example, simply providing additional information can lead
to the creation of subcategories of the stereotype, e.g., the “Iron
Maiden.” See text at nn. 22-26.
51 See Deaux & Lewis, supra note 25; Information as Deterrent,
supra note 18; Locksley, Borgida, Brekke & Hepburn, supra note
46; Locksley, Hepburn & Ortiz, supra note 46; Pheterson, Kiesler
& Goldberg, supra note 10; Rasinski, Crocker & Hastie, supra note
46. For a review use Fiske & Neuberg, supra note 26.
52 Not coincidentally, the evaluation settings in which differential treatment has been discovered are ones in which either little
more than sex category information is made salient, see, e.g.,
Effects of Applicants’ Sex, supra note 18, the additional information provided is not definitive but is ambiguous in its implications, see, e.g., Heneman, Impact of Test Information and Applicant Sex on Applicant Evaluations in a Selection Simulation, 62 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 524 (1977), or the additional information
provided is weakly, if at all, related to the target decision. See,
é.g., Dipboye, Fromkin & Wiback, supra note 27.
58 Borgida, Locksley & Brekke, Social Stereotypes and Social
Judgment in PERSONALITY, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL INTERACTION
1538 (N. Cantor & J. Kihlstrom eds. 1981); Locksley, Borgida,
Brekke & Hepburn, supra note 46. Many behavioral evaluation
systems are readily available. See, e.g., B. SCHNEIDER & N.

SCHMITT, STAFFING ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1986).
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Because information is rarely sufficient to prevent
stereotyping, particularly if the category in question,
like sex, is widely used and readily accessible, employers
should attempt to ensure that evaluators pay attention
both to the forming of erroneous impressions and to the
particularized information that will temper the tendency
to stereotype. Both sufficient time and concentrated attention are necessary to undercut stereotyping if information inconsistent with the stereotype is to have an
impact on the evaluator.*

As important, employers must motivate evaluators to
avoid stereotypical judgments. If individuals are motivated to be accurate in their decisions and to base those
decisions on individual characteristics, they will be less
likely to use stereotypic categories. * At least three types
of organizational incentives encourage people to avoid
stereotyping.

54 See Burnstein & Schul, The Information Basis of Social Judgments: Operations in Forming Impressions of Other Persons, 18
J. EXPER. Soc. PsycHoLocy 217 (1982); Jamieson & Zanna, Need
for Structure in Attitude Formation and Expression in ATTITUDE

:

First, interdependence undercuts stereotyping and encourages more accurate, particularized impressions.®
Thus, an organization that makes teamwork explicit,
makes promotions depend on group products, and em-

55 See Fiske & Neuberg, supra note 26; Higgins & Bargh, supra
note 26; Kruglanski, Motivations for Judging and Knowing: Implications for Causal Attribution in 2 HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION
AND COGNITION (E. Higgins & R. Sorrentino eds. in press).

56 See M. Suerir & C. SHERIF, GROUPS IN HARMONY AND TEN-

SION (1953); Deutch, An Experimental Study of the Effects of
Cooperation and Competition upon Group Process, 2 Hum. RE.LATIONS 199 (1949); Neuberg & Fiske, Motivational Influences on
Attention, and Individuating Processes, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.

PSYCHOLOGY 431 (1987).
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For a review see Fiske & Neuberg, supra
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STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION (A. Pratkanis, S. Breckler & A. Green-

wald eds. in press).
note 26.
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phasizes supervisors’ responsibilities for their subordinates’ success can reduce stereotyping.
Second, if decisionmakers are reminded that the subordinate’s future depends on their judgments and if the
employer emphasizes accuracy, then decisionmakers make
less stereotyped, more particularized evaluations.*” Such
considerations as decision accuracy must be salient to the

decisionmaker in the immediate context of the evaluation,

not just, as here, in a little known policy statement.

Finally, the opinion of a third party to the evaluation
process, particularly that of a superior or colleague, can
exert a major influence on the decisional process and the
decision itself. For example, in evaluating a leader’s performance, group members rated a female leader as more
effective when her position had been specifically legitimized by superiors. See Evaluations of Men & Women
Leaders, supra note 25. Similarly, if people are held
accountable and anticipate that they will have to justify
their assessments, they show greater accuracy and exhibit
fewer overconfident generalizations.** These salutary outcomes will occur, however, only when the third parties are
known to discourage stereotypical thinking. In contrast,
an evaluator may choose to endorse stereotypic charact57 See, e.g., Freund, Kruglanski & Schpitizajzen, The Freezing
and Unfreezing of Impression Primacy: Effects of the
Structure and the Fear of Invalidity, 11 PERSONALITY &
CHOLOGY BULL. 479 (1985); Neuberg & Fiske, supra
Touhey, Role Perception and the Relative Influence of the

and the Perceived, 87 J. Soc. PSycHOLoGy 213 (1972).

Need for
Soc. Psynote 56;
Perceiver

58 See Mayseless & Kruglanski, What Makes You So Sure?
Effects of Epistemic Motivations on Judgmental Confidence, 39
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 162 (1987);
Tetlock, Accountability and Complexity of Thought, 45 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsycHoLoGy 74 (1983); Tetlock, Accountability
and the Perseverance of First Impressions, 46 Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
Q. 285 (1983); Tetlock & Kim, Accountability and Judgment
Processes in a Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. PERSONALITY &

Soc. PsycHoLocy 700 (1987).
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erizations if those judgments are believed, as in petitioner’s case, to be compatible with those of peers or superiors.
In sum, although stereotyping is pervasive, it is not
inevitable. Natural tendencies to evaluate women negatively on the basis of their categorical membership can

be overcome by systematic organizational interventions.
CONCLUSION

There is substantial and convergent social science evidence that stereotyping of women, particularly in the
evaluation of those who seek high status in the workplace,
exists and negatively affects their chances for selection
and promotion. The methods used by Dr. Fiske, respondent’s expert, to analyze the evidence of adverse stereotypic
judgments madeby petitioner’s partners are standard in
the field. Researchers regularly examine natural and
simulated settings to determine the extent to which those
settings manifest the antecedent conditions and behavioral
indicators that result in stereotypic judgments. In such
an examination it is customary to scrutinize the verbal
record of decisionmakers’ comments, descriptions, ratings,
and behavior regarding the individual evaluated. This is
precisely what Dr. Fiske did. See Tr. 615.
Current research and theory supports Dr. Fiske’s conclusions that the conditions that promote, and the indicators that evidence, stereotyping appear to have been present at Price Waterhouse, which failed to monitor and take
appropriate action to diminish stereotyping. In light of
that research, the record supports the conclusion that the
adverse consequences suffered by respondent were the natural and foreseeable outcome of the petitioner’s conduct.
For all the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully requests this Court to affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit insofar as
that decision relies on a finding of stereotypic thinking
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on the part of petitioner, its translation into discriminatory action, and petitioner’s failure to provide a setting
in which the discriminatory consequences of stereotyping
would be substantially reduced.
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